by Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar
Why do interest groups mobilise to change the design of international institutions? The existing research on this topic expects moments when there is a peak in political action, but generally does not consider how such peaks might impact future mobilisations. To fill this gap, my recent article published in Policy & Politics entitled Policy feedback and the politics of trade agreements, seeks to provide an explanation for the conditions under which interest groups mobilise around trade policies using a policy feedback framework.
In particular, I argue that interest groups are more likely to mobilise around polarising (aspects of) trade policy when they have had bad experiences with them before. In other words—organisations are more likely to take action when they have reason to believe that a particular policy will harm their constituents or goals because they have engaged in political learning.
To test this explanation, I use a within- and between-case analysis of US and EU trade policies using a variety of evidence, including conference proceedings, interviews, and public statements. I conclude that, although this varies in the EU by whether the trade negotiations are bi- or multi-lateral, overall, EU groups are less likely to mobilise than their US counterparts.
This article makes an important contribution to the literature on trade politics and policy feedback as well as drawing out significant implications for the future of designing and negotiating trade agreements.
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You can read the original research in Policy & Politics at
Cezar, R. F. (2024). Policy feedback and the politics of trade agreements. Policy & Politics (published online ahead of print 2024),
available from: < https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2024D000000041>
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Ramírez, V., and Velázquez Leyer, R. (2023). The impact of self-reinforcing and self-undermining policy feedback on Mexican social policy: the end of the conditional cash transfer programme. Policy & Politics 51, 3, 508-529, available from: < https://doi.org/10.1332/030557321X16813697853773>
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