Policy & Politics Journal Blog

by Andrea Migone and Michael Howlett

In a recent article published in Policy & Politics, authors Andrea Migone and Michael Howlett offer a compelling new framework for understanding the quality of policy advisory systems. Their framework draws on Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (EVL) model, which suggests three ways individuals respond to perceived decline or dissatisfaction within an organisation/relationship: (i) exit by withdrawing from the situation, (ii) voice by expressing concerns and seeking improvement, and (iii) loyalty by remaining in the situation and hoping for improvement. Building on this model, the authors propose a more dynamic approach to assessing how advisory systems function — and why some produce better advice than others.

Although the concept of a policy advisory system is well established in the literature, Migone and Howlett argue that existing models remain too focused on structure and location. Simply distinguishing between actors inside and outside government tells us little about the actual quality of advice being produced. To address this gap, they develop what they call a “Hirschman 2.0” model of advisory system behaviour.

Hirschman’s original schema proposed that dissatisfied actors in an organisation could exit, voice concern, or remain loyal. Migone and Howlett extend this by recognising degraded or self-interested variants of these behaviours — such as quiet disengagement, cynical silence, or sycophantic loyalty — that distort the overall quality of policy advice over time. They argue that the proportion of principled versus opportunistic behaviours within a policy advisory system can be used to assess how healthy or compromised the system has become.

The article sets out three ideal-type policy advisory system configurations:

• a virtuous system where voice and principled loyalty predominate;
• a system skewed towards exit and disengagement;
• a system skewed towards opportunism and conformity.

These models help explain how advisory systems evolve — and how they may degrade — with real consequences for the kind of information available to policymakers.

Importantly, the article also offers ideas for reform. Drawing on examples from Canada, Italy and South Korea, the authors show how systems can be recalibrated by broadening the base of contributors, strengthening the role of independent or external advice, and resisting pressures toward silence or co-option.

By reconceptualising policy advisory systems behaviour in this way, the article makes a significant contribution to both theory and practice. It offers a clear and adaptable framework for analysing advisory quality, and encourages further research into how policy advisory systems can be managed to support robust, independent and inclusive forms of advice.

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You can read the original research in Policy & Politics at

Migone, A., and Howlett, M. (2025). A theory of policy advisory system quality: Hirschman 2.0 or what makes for good policy advice?. Policy & Politics 53, 1, 44-64, available from: < https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2024D000000035>

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Lemor, A. C., Costa, M. A., Beaulieu-Guay, L., and Montpetit, É. (2025). Why did the influence of experts erode during the COVID-19 pandemic?. Policy & Politics 53, 2, 383-402, available from: < https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2024D000000064>

Krizsán, A., and Fekete, D. (2025). Legitimising policy knowledge in autocratising contexts: the case of Hungary. Policy & Politics (published online ahead of print 2025), available from: < https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2024D000000061>