by Matthew Flinders, Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen and Thurid Hustedt
Although often overlooked, the rise of populism has placed additional pressures on the relationship between ministers and their senior civil servants. Dismissed as part of ‘the elite’, ‘the establishment’ or even ‘the blob’, the civil service has in many countries been required to adapt and navigate an increasingly fluid set of politico-administrative boundaries. In this context it was highly symbolic that the United Kingdom’s new prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, issued a direct message to all civil servants as one of his first acts in office.
‘I am so pleased to have this early opportunity to speak directly to every one of you…… working in the Civil Service’ he stated ‘I want you to know that– you have my confidence, my support and, importantly, my respect.’
The fact that the new occupant of No.10 was at exactly the same time trying to install new media management structures underlines the existence of a potential tension between, on the one hand, a ministers desire to respect the civil service and established constitutional relationships, but on the other hand, ensure that officials do promote a positive ‘spin’ on the work of the government.
The root issue is that senior civil servants are expected to be politically neutral and largely anonymous and yet their role in relation to media management brings with it politicising tendencies and risks. As Rod Rhodes noted in his book Everyday Life in British Government (2011) ‘…nowadays, senior civil servants speak in public almost as often as ministers’.’
Understanding whether and under which conditions civil servants can respond to requests for advice and assistance in managing the media from ministerial masters is therefore crucial.
How do senior civil servants cope with the pressures of media management, and how does this affect different relationships? Are senior civil servants increasingly required to be ‘promiscuously partisan’ as Peter Aucoin once suggested?
Our extensive research in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, recently published in Policy & Politics, has helped tease-apart the various layers to this question.
By blending the theory of public sector bargaining with existing studies of politico-administrative media management, and interviewing over sixty officials, ministers and special advisers, our recent study came to three main conclusions.
First and foremost, none of the three cases found evidence of widespread problems in relation to breaching rules, sacrificing neutrality, or undermining anonymity. However, civil servants perceive their political neutrality to be under more pressure than their professional anonymity.
The second conclusion was that different types of public sector bargain have emerged in different countries. In Sweden it is more explicit and institutionalised, with a clear separation between politicized advisors and neutral civil servants, which effectively distances senior officials from media management. In Denmark and the UK, the ‘bargain’ is more opaque and the role of senior civil servants in relation to media management has increased which, in turn, demands a more nuanced understanding of respective roles.
This leads to a third and final conclusion that ‘new’ public service bargains are not generally emerging, but processes of institutional adaptation are occurring in which traditional relationships are modified to fit new circumstances. The notion of a ‘bargain’ [singular] is therefore problematic, due to the way in which it over-emphasises a steady-state situation and under-emphasises the existence of dialectical processes in which bargaining is a constant and ongoing process.
But why does any of this actually matter? How do these findings fit within broader controversies and concern about the future of the state or the health of democracy?
Why? Because it highlights the role and value of having explicit guidelines or even legal boundaries to clarify the respective spheres of minsters, advisers and officials. As the premiership of Boris Johnson in the UK revealed, a constitution that relies only on the self-restraint of politicians is likely to collapse under the pressures of populism.
Why? Because clarity of role and respect for boundaries facilitates open conversations and constructive push back. Hubris syndrome is a pathology of modern politics and clear rules and questioning officials provide part of the antidote.
Why? Because in a global environment that is almost defined by concerns about misinformation, ‘alt-truths’ and increasing affective polarisation, the role of permanent, non-partisan and generally trusted public servants in presenting a credible evidence base, outlining both sides of an argument or simply listening to the views of the public is arguably more important than it has ever been.
You can read the original research in Policy & Politics at
Salomonsen, H. H., Flinders, M., & Hustedt, T. (2024). A comparative analysis of senior civil servants’ involvement in media management. Policy & Politics (published online ahead of print 2024). from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2024D000000037
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Aagaard, P., Chatzopoulou, S., & Poulsen, B. (2024). Analysing expert advice on political decisions in times of crisis. Policy & Politics, 52(1), 24-43. from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2023D000000003
Wesal Zaman, A., Rubin, O., & Staupe-Delgado, R. (2024). The challenges experts face during creeping crises: the curse of complacency. Policy & Politics, 52(1), 131-152. from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2023D000000017
Yildirim, T. M. (2024). Patterns of stability and change in media attention in Europe. Policy & Politics, 52(2), 341-358. from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2024D000000026
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