Using randomised controlled trials to evaluate public service delivery: how best to attract families to Sure Start?

Sarah Cotterill, Peter John and Alice Moseley
Sarah Cotterill, Peter John and Alice Moseley

Sarah Cotterill, University of Manchester, Peter John, University College London and Alice Moseley, University of Exeter, discuss their article, ‘Does mobilisation increase family engagement with an early childhood intervention programme? A randomised controlled trial’ which was published in Policy & Politics in 2013, and is available free during April 2014.

Sure Start services are popular with families in the UK, but not all families who might benefit choose to attend. Two methods which are commonly used to promote Sure Start are leaflets and door-to-door visits. Both methods are known to be effective in other contexts, such as mobilizing citizens to vote or encouraging them to recycle, but, prior to our study, there was no evidence of their effectiveness in promoting attendance at local services. Working in partnership with a local authority provider of Sure Start services, we set out to test whether a leaflet about Sure Start or a door-to-door visit from an outreach worker are persuasive methods of attracting families to attend Sure Start centres.

We used a randomised controlled trial (RCT), which is fairly novel in research on public services, yet has the potential to provide a convincing estimate of the effect of policy interventions. Using the register of births, we identified children born in the previous eighteen months, whose families had not yet attended Sure Start. We randomly assigned families to one of three conditions: a leaflet about Sure Start, a visit from an outreach worker, or a control group that received no special treatment. Over several weeks we measured the outcome, by recording whether or not the families attended their local Sure Start centre. We compared attendance by families in the three groups to see whether attendance differed across the different interventions. The advantage of random assignment is that membership of the treatment and control groups are very similar in all respects. Therefore, any differences in observed outcomes between the groups can reasonably be attributed to the intervention rather than any other cause. We found that the brief doorstep visits and leaflets implemented in this study were not a worthwhile way of promoting Sure Start to families who are not already engaged: although we cannot rule out a small effect, the results of the visits and leaflets were not significantly different from the effect of the usual service.

We believe that RCTs could usefully be employed much more extensively in the evaluation of public services. Find out more from our book, Nudge, Nudge, Think, Think: Using Experiments to Change Civic Behaviour, in which we describe the RCT method and offer examples of its use in testing various interventions to promote civic behaviour such as recycling, charitable giving and organ donation.

‘Does mobilisation increase family engagement with an early childhood intervention programme? A randomised controlled trial’ is available free on Ingenta during April 2014.

Policy & Politics Annual Lecture 2014: Bringing Politics Alive: Engaging the Disengaged in the 21st Century

David BlunkettOn 27th March 2014 David Blunkett MP visited the University of Bristol to give the annual Policy & Politics lecture. To get a flavour of what was a fascinating evening, take a look at the short film we have produced to capture the event.

David also gave us the text of his talk beforehand. As you might expect, he didn’t stick entirely to script. He also took questions from the audience and via Twitter.

The paradox of security regulation: public protection versus normative legitimation

Adam White
Adam White

Adam White, University of York, discusses his article, written with Martin Smith – The paradox of security regulation: public protection versus normative legitimation – available in issue 42.3 of Policy & Politics.

The UK private security industry has been playing an interesting and tricky hand of late. On one side, the Coalition government has presented it with huge opportunities for growth by simultaneously slashing police budgets and promoting outsourcing. On the other side, it has been prevented from taking full advantage of these opportunities because of its rather shady reputation – a problem intensified by recent high profile scandals, from the 2012 Olympics security debacle to overcharging the Home Office on electronic tagging contacts. 

One central way in which the industry has been playing this hand has been to throw down the regulation card. The industry has been using statutory regulation to cover itself in the reassuring images and symbols of the state, thereby cleaning up its shady image to a certain degree and putting itself in the position of being able to take full advantage of any opportunities coming its way.

In this article, we call this ‘normative legitimation’: the process through which the private security industry seeks to legitimate its activities to sceptical citizen-consumers by appealing to the state-centric norms which permeate the domestic security sector. We argue that this process creates an unusual and interesting regulatory politics. The more the state introduces regulation to protect the public from the industry, the more the state (consciously and unconsciously) legitimates the industry and allows it to come into further contact with the public.

After a brief tour through the history of liberal discourse and politics (where security becomes connected to the state), the article turns to the paradox of security regulation in postwar Britain. This article (we hope) will appeal to anyone interested in how the private security industry is positioning itself within today’s rapidly changing security landscape.

The paradox of security regulation: public protection versus normative legitimation is available on Ingenta.

How do you measure public confidence in public services?

Richard Cowell and James Downe
Richard Cowell and James Downe

Richard Cowell and James Downe from Cardiff University discuss their article on the intricacies of measuring public confidence in public services. ‘Public confidence and public services: it matters what you measure’ (Policy and Politics 40(1)) is available free on Ingenta until 31 March 2014.

The belief that the public should have confidence in their public institutions is an enduring societal concern, yet as an outcome it seems increasingly elusive. One survey after another suggests continual public disaffection with politicians and politics. While governments across the political spectrum express concern about declining levels of confidence in our public institutions, and lay claim to actions to address it, they seem to be having little impact.

Our paper focuses on one of the most intuitive mechanisms by which governments might lift public confidence – by improving public services. Here we find a puzzle that official measures such as statutory performance indicators, inspection reports and user satisfaction surveys showed steady improvement in public services between 2001 and 2008 but, counter-intuitively, levels of public confidence declined.

Our argument was that if this elusive relationship between public services and public confidence was ever going to reveal itself, then the issue of measurement itself needed careful scrutiny i.e. does it matter what you measure? One immediate problem is that the public have a fragmentary knowledge of government services. Moreover, there are multiple and competing ways of measuring the quality of services – such as efficiency and value for money, or accessibility and quality – not all appreciated equally by all sections of society. The same fuzziness clouds concepts of confidence and trust. Confidence in public institutions may be based on evidence from using public services or on the sense of emotional attachment one feels towards the service provider. Public perceptions about services also come entangled in wider concerns about the honesty and responsiveness of public institutions, both of staff and the politicians to whom they are accountable.

Our approach used the (then) burgeoning piles of data about local government and its services to test statistically the performance-public confidence link. Some of the measures came from our own survey of local government managers, of whom we asked (i) the extent to which they thought services provided by their local council had improved and (ii) whether they believed that local people had a high level of confidence in their authority. Other measures came from external assessments of changes in performance and public confidence for each local authority.

Our analysis confirmed the paradoxical tendency observed at national level, in that improved local services was associated with declining public satisfaction with the way that councils run things. We also found that local managers – perhaps wisely – tended not to rely solely on official measures of service performance to judge how their council is doing, as the wider set of measures that managers used exhibited a slightly stronger and positive relationship with public confidence. From this we concluded that the idea of a relationship between service quality and public confidence should not be abandoned, but that the measures needed further thought.

Our analysis was conducted between 2008 and 2009, and the storms that have since blown across the UK and other democratic states give strong reason for an intensified focus on the public services/public confidence nexus.

Deep cuts in public spending have unfolded simultaneously with marked shifts in government priorities and new political narratives. For governments, being seen to be in control of public finances is now presented as a key determinant of public confidence, with efficiency suddenly pre-eminent among the basket of measures by which ‘performance’ might be measured. The May 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government has sought to manage tensions between budget cuts and service quality through ‘the big society’ and ‘localism’, with the expectation that local communities can become more responsible for service provision (and less likely to place responsibility for any shortcomings on national government). It matters, we would argue, that researchers can trace these shifting policy theories and their outcomes.

We suggested developing multiple indicators alongside in-depth qualitative research to try and unpack what determines levels of public confidence. It is disappointing therefore that the coalition government also cut much of the data-gathering machinery that our research had utilised. Organisations with a keen interest in policy impact, such as the Audit Commission and the Standards Board for England, have been axed. The biennial Citizenship Survey, which gathered information on public participation activities and trust in government has been stopped as well as the regular survey of attitudes to standards in public life.

As our paper has shown, studying the relationship between service performance and public confidence is rarely likely to generate unambiguous good news, yet it matters for informed policy discussion that some measurements are made.

Public confidence and public services: it matters what you measure’ (Policy and Politics 40(1)) is available free on Ingenta until 31 March 2014.

Public Procurement in a Globalizing World

Sangeeta Khorana
Sangeeta Khorana

Sangeeta Khorana and William Kerr discusses their article, Transforming Vietnam: a quest for improved efficiency and transparency in central government procurement, written with Nishikant Mishra (all from Aberystwyth University) in the latest issue of Policy & Politics

As the world becomes increasingly globalized and trade barriers to both goods and services decline through preferential trade agreements, one major aspect of economic activity remains closed, to a considerable degree, in most countries – government procurement. The continued isolation of government procurement processes is important because of the size and importance of government economic activity in national economic life. In most modern market economies, the proportion of gross domestic product comprised of government activity exceeds 30 percent and may range up to 50 percent. In some developing countries, the proportion attributable to government may be even higher. Excluding such large portions of economic activity from the benefits of trade liberalization may considerably inhibit economic growth and impede economic development.

There are many reasons why government procurement remains closed to international competition. It is often difficult for politicians to justify government expenditures on foreign products to taxpayers – even if those taxpayers are happy to purchase imports themselves. The question is also often asked by local suppliers to the government who are also taxpayers – “I pay taxes and you use that money to buy foreign products that compete with my products.” Politicians may also see procurement as a means to use public money to reward political supporters and as a means to buy votes. In the case of some goods and services, there may be a fear of losing local control or being dependent on foreign suppliers. Government procurement contracts can also offer considerable opportunities for garnering corruption income. Opening procurement contracts to foreign bidders often requires a higher level of transparency in the bidding process that makes it much more difficult for rent seekers to extract income through corrupt practices. As a result, the goods and services procured by governments are often the last major area of economic activity subjected to the pressure of foreign competition.

Widespread reservations about opening government procurement processes to foreign competition has also meant that arriving at an international agreement to liberalize government procurement has proved much more difficult that negotiating international trade agreements such as the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) – each with more than 150 signatory countries.

As a result, there is only a plurilateral international agreement on the liberalization of government procurement where countries can choose not to belong. The plurilateral agreement is the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) which has not attracted a wide membership from the international community. Only 42 countries have chosen to join the GPA. Developing countries are conspicuous by their absence – only 6 have chosen to join.

In our article, Transforming Vietnam: a quest for improved efficiency and transparency in central government procurement, we use a cost benefit approach to discuss some of these issues. Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007 and was allowed observer status to the WTO GPA in December 2012. As a major and rapidly growing developing country considering joining the GPA, it would be a major coup for the liberalization of procurement as Vietnam might be an example to spur other developing countries to join. The decision to join the GPA, or not, has been a difficult one for Vietnam and its struggles with the question provides a fascinating case study that sheds considerable light on the questions that governments in developing countries face in considering membership to the WTO GPA.

Transforming Vietnam: a quest for improved efficiency and transparency in central government procurement is part of the Policy & Politics January 14 issue (volume 42, number 1) and is available on Ingenta.

Why do institutions fail?

Sarah Spencer
Sarah Spencer

Sarah Spencer (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford) discuss her article ‘Context, institution or accountability? Exploring the factors that shape the performance of national human rights and equality bodies‘, part of the new issue of Policy & Politics.

In recent months alone we need look no further than the Co-op bank, the UK Border Agency or Staffordshire hospital to find a systemic breakdown in performance, raising the question: why do institutions fail? Where failure is too harsh a judgement, we may nevertheless ask why we so regularly see a marked gap in the private and state sectors between public expectations and the outputs and outcomes that are achieved.

Is it an internal matter – a failure of leadership, poor management, or inadequate resources? If those factors play a part, do they merely reflect structural flaws in systems of regulation and accountability? Or should we be looking more to the external context: a hostile economic or political climate perhaps, or inflated public and media expectations which mean that the institution operates in an environment in which will inevitably and unfairly be seen to fail?

Teasing out the balance of factors that account for the performance of any institution is no easy matter where so many variables are at play and few impacts are measurable. It is necessary, however, if we are to avoid making simplistic assumptions that poor leadership is to blame, let’s say, or harsh budget cuts.

One set of institutions provides ripe territory for exploring these questions: statutory human rights and equality bodies. Britain’s troubled Equality and Human Rights Commission has not been alone in facing criticism of its performance since it was established in 2007: that of its counterparts in Northern Ireland and Ireland have likewise come under fire. The literature on the proliferating number of these bodies world wide, moreover, suggests the challenges they are facing, internally and externally, display some common themes.

Colin Harvey (Queen’s University, Belfast) and I attempt to throw light on this conundrum in ‘Context, institution or accountability? Exploring the factors that shape the performance of national human rights and equality bodies’. A comparative analysis of the six statutory human rights and (or) equality bodies in the UK and Ireland, in which we have both also served as Commissioners, draws on the experiences of 23 other informants who have been closely engaged in the work of these bodies alongside scrutiny of their statutes, secondary legislation and operational reports.

The establishment of these institutions over the past two decades coincided with a renewed confidence in arms’ length regulatory bodies using standard setting, monitoring and enforcement to improve the performance of others. The UN, Council of Europe and European Commission, within their respective mandates, encouraged the global expansion of such bodies, setting minimum standards of independence, accountability and mandate with which they should comply. Expectations in civil society often ran high in the early days, anticipating a step change in the protection of human rights and equality of opportunity. What happened next, the varying strengths (evident in many cases) but also the limitations in delivery require an explanation.

We found no single factor accounted for the performance of the six bodies in our study but differing combinations of positive and negative factors. Comparative analysis was revealing: for instance the more supportive political context in Scotland than that in Northern Ireland, and the accountability of the Scottish Human Rights Commission to the legislature rather than, as for the other bodies, to the executive. Institutional architecture, statutory duties, powers and resources differ markedly, as do the significance of relationships with the UN and European bodies on the one hand and civil society groups on the other.

Beyond the significance of each institution’s varying remit, powers, structure and resource constraints, leadership and effective management were found to be crucial factors, alongside the political acumen necessary to steer the ship through turbulent times. The institutions may take some comfort from the fact that it is those factors which are those most within their control.

Dr Sarah Spencer CBE
Senior Fellow
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society
University of Oxford
Sarah.spencer@compas.ox.ac.uk

Context, institution or accountability? Exploring the factors that shape the performance of national human rights and equality bodies‘, by Sarah Spencer and Colin Harvey, is part of the Policy & Politics January 14 issue (volume 42, number 1) and is available on Ingenta.

Water dripping on stone’? Industry lobbying and UK alcohol policy

Ben Hawkins and Chris Holden
Ben Hawkins and Chris Holden

Ben Hawkins (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) and Chris Holden (University of York) discuss their article ”Water dripping on stone’? Industry lobbying and UK alcohol policy’, part of the new issue of Policy & Politics.

Following the decision by the UK government in July 2013 to shelve plans for minimum unit pricing of alcohol (MUP), questions began to arise about the role and influence of David Cameron’s election strategist Lynton Crosby – who has worked for both the alcohol and tobacco industries – in the abandonment of a policy the government had committed to unequivocally in its 2012 alcohol strategy. The controversy surrounding Crosby was indicative of wider concerns amongst scholars and policy actors that the government had accorded too much influence to the alcohol industry. The previous New Labour government had also been widely criticised for its closeness to the alcohol industry. However, while Labour’s policy agenda was widely in line with industry preferences, the Coalition Government elevated the role of industry actors even further, institutionalising their involvement in the development and execution of policy through the Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network.

In contrast the Scottish National Party administration in Scotland was elected – initially in 2007 as a minority government and subsequently with an outright majority in 2011 – with a clear commitment to introduce MUP. Developments in Scotland represent a shift in UK alcohol policy from an almost exclusive focus on industry favoured measures with a weak evidence base towards interventions such as MUP which the international research consensus suggests is amongst the most likely to reduce harms, but which the majority of the alcohol industry oppose. Despite initial attempts to introduce MUP being voted down by the opposition MSPs in 2010, the measure was eventually passed by the Scottish Parliament in May 2012.

In the context of this highly contested and rapidly evolving policy debate, our article sought to examine the mechanisms through which alcohol industry actors engage in and attempt to influence policy debates. The alcohol industry consists not just of the producers and marketers of alcoholic beverages but the routes to market including pubs and nightclubs in the on-trade and off-licences, convenience stores and larger supermarket chains in the off-trade. We found that industry actors are involved at all stages of the policy process from agenda setting, through policy formulation and legislation, to implementation and evaluation. They seek to engage with a range of policy makers including MPs, MSPs, Ministers, civil servants and members of the public health and NGO community. Even members of the opposition are targeted, especially where a change of administration seems likely and there is potential to shape a future government’s policies from the outset.

Their modus operandi is to seek to establish long term relationships with key policy actors through a range of forums and channels including official policy consultations, party conferences, and All Party Parliamentary Groups on industry-related issues. Contacts are thus both formal and informal and initiated by individual corporations as well as their trade associations and social aspects organisations (e.g. The Portman Group). Many industry actors have extensive personal connections in government or employ outside consultancies and agencies who can provide these. Whilst smaller companies rely more heavily on trade associations and collective representation, larger companies may seek to represent their own interests where these are seen to deviate from the industry or sector more generally or where there is a perceived advantage from adopting a different approach (e.g. to be seen as a leader on a specific issue). All agreed though that the ability to present governments with a united front is a big advantage in pursuing a particular policy outcome.

Long term relationship building with policy makers has the effect not just of creating sustained alliances which can be used to pursue favourable regulation. More fundamentally, it creates the impression that industry actors are stakeholders in the policy making process; key partners who are part of the solution to alcohol related harms and who should have a place at the policy making table as a matter of course. The economic power of industry actors, their ability to provide local and national politicians with good news stories such as the opening of a new supermarket or photo opportunities at a local distillery, guarantees them additional access to politicians.

Positioning themselves as partners in this way is a key objective for industry actors and a key difference with tobacco companies, which are widely excluded from such forums. It affords them great power to shape, inform and delay policy decisions and creates the norm that industry positions should be heard and where possible accommodated. Whilst the position of industry actors in the policy making process is widely criticised by the public health community, it is widely accepted by many officials and politicians. Indeed policy makers explained how welcome industry input can be where they are able to provide resources (both financial and informational), or meet policy objectives through self-regulatory regimes which obviate the need for costly, time consuming legislation and enforcement mechanisms.

The ability to provide these ‘policy goods’ to ministers ensures their voices is heard in any policy deliberations. Where long-term relationships are unable to secure the desired outcomes, however, industry actors are fully prepared to employ short-term issue specific tactics. These include the initiation of legal proceedings, which are now holding up the implementation of minimum pricing in Scotland.

”Water dripping on stone’? Industry lobbying and UK alcohol policy’ is part of the Policy & Politics January 14 issue (volume 42, number 1) and is available on Ingenta.

Gary Craig and Hannah Lewis wonder why ‘multiculturalism is never talked about’

craig-lewis
Gary Craig and Hannah Lewis

Gary Craig and Hannah Lewis discuss their article ”Multiculturalism is never talked about’: community cohesion and local policy contradictions in England’, part of the new issue of Policy & Politics.

Ever since immigrants began to come to the UK in significant numbers after the Second World War, governments have sought to find ways to manage relations between the white British ‘host’ community and new arrivals. This was politically problematic from the earliest days in the late 1940s as some British people resented their arrival; these tensions led in some cases to what were dubbed ‘race’ riots, initially blamed on migrants failing to adjust but later recognised to be generated by white hostility, assisted by racist policing responses. Initially, it was widely assumed that immigrants would assimilate into British culture and effectively become British people in every way save for the colour of their skins. This assimilationist approach was later (in the 1960s) recognised as unrealistic and demeaning to migrants’ cultures and identity, and gave way to approaches which were more respectful of migrants’ original identities; structures and organisations were created under the general rubric of race relations or community relations.

Eventually, the official policy response became known as multiculturalism, whereby, within a broad acceptance of British values and norms, migrants were free to maintain many important elements of their own culture. By the early part of the 21st century, however, in the context of increasing diversity and growing minority numbers, and anxiety about the growth of terrorism, some influential political voices were arguing that migrants were establishing what were effectively autonomous communities separate from the mainstream of British society. One such influential voice, Trevor Phillips, argued that Britain was ‘sleepwalking towards segregation’ and that this was the cause of much social and economic dislocation and, indeed, major disturbances in areas where there were significant migrant settlements. This ignored the fact that for many years, migrants had been disproportionately affected by poverty and social exclusion as a result of institutional and individual racism, and heavy-handed policing. The dominant government position now is that ‘multiculturalism is dead’ and the policy clock appears to be edging back towards an assimilationist position under the policy cover of what is now known as community cohesion and other similarly amorphous terms.

This article reports a study of managing local cultural relations in a city in northern England which found that ‘multiculturalism’ is never talked about in local authority policies or practices. The overall picture was one which distanced significantly from an explicit ‘race’ agenda, instead focusing on language, narratives and perceptions of difference and community tensions This shift appeared to be at the expense of tackling inequalities with targeted service provision and the representation of migrant and minority individuals or groups in local initiatives. The result is a dual, apparently contradictory process. The de-emphasis of ‘race’ in community cohesion and equalities policies aimed at managing difference has emerged alongside heightened security concerns, hostile media representations and xenophobia which reify different, Other, identifiable and racialised groups, in particular Muslims. It is now far more difficult to source financial support for migrant community organisations but the difficulties facing these communities – often generated by racist responses – remain.

 ”Multiculturalism is never talked about’: community cohesion and local policy contradictions in England’ is part of the Policy & Politics January 14 issue (volume 42, number 1) and is available on Ingenta.

New Labour, Blue Labour, and conservatism. Whoever wins, the blues will triumph

Jonathan Davies
Jonathan S. Davies

by Jonathan S. Davies, De Montfort University

Active Citizenship: Navigating the Conservative Heartlands of the New Labour Project (Policy & Politics, Volume 40, Number 1) by Jonathan S. Davies, De Montfort University, is available free until 28 February 2014.

One of many bones of contention about New Labour was the extent to which it was faithful to traditional Labour ideas, albeit in a new form, or a radical departure onto the terrain of Thatcherism, neoliberalism and conservatism. The Blair and Brown governments (between 1997 and 2010) represented themselves as modernising traditional social democratic ideas and making them fit for a globalised knowledge economy. Advised and supported by leading intellectuals such as Anthony Giddens, they concluded that with the right policies, a dynamic market economy is entirely compatible with the principles of social justice. In place of redistributive measures to achieve income equality (such as high taxes on the rich), it advocated equality of opportunity; the idea that investing in people is a better way of achieving justice than income redistribution. New Labour appropriated the slogan “no rights without responsibilities”, reflecting the idea that entitlements should be earned.

New Labour supporters saw this complex of ideas as distinguishing them from Thatcherites. While accepting the principles of a global free market, they argued, investing in equality of opportunity created clear red water on the terrain social policy. In this paper, I argue that in fact New Labour’s social policy agenda drew inspiration from conservatism, not social democracy. I use the speeches of ministers and government documents to demonstrate this point in six different areas of active citizenship policy: learning, democratic renewal, volunteering, family policy, personal thrift and public consumption. Not only did New Labour draw explicitly from Conservative thinkers, it also utilised ideas fashionable in the later years of Margaret Thatcher’s government and throughout John Major’s. Perhaps most strikingly, in announcing that there should be no rights without responsibilities Tony Blair turned out to be plagiarising none other than Margaret Thatcher. In short, I found strong continuities between Thatcherism and New Labour in precisely those areas that New Labour sought to differentiate itself. I argue that throughout the economic and social policy fields, New Labour broke from traditional social democratic ideas and instead maintained continuity with the ideas of Conservative forebears; and by extension, continuity with the neoliberal agenda of free markets and right wing morality as a whole.

Events since the General Election of 2010 have only confirmed my suspicions. The Labour Party has flirted with the reactionary “Blue Labour” ideas of Maurice Glasman. Blue Labour openly advocates the conservative view of citizenship that motivated the Blair and Brown governments, promoting traditional values of “family, faith and flag”. The Conservatives, for their part, have Philip Blonde’s “Red Tory” and its “big society” derivative. Lambasted and ridiculed by Labour as a cover story for austerity cuts, the “big society” quickly disappeared from public discourse. But the idea is very persistent. Big society commitments to rolling back the nanny state, de-centralising power, promoting personal responsibility and neighbourliness were always familiar themes in the speeches of New Labour ministers including Tony Blair, David Blunkett, Gordon Brown, Alan Milburn and Jack Straw.

While distancing himself from embarrassing comments by Glasman, Ed Miliband has been happy to associate himself with Blue Labour thinking. If he is elected Prime Minister in 2015, there is no reason to think he will abandon those ideas. On the contrary, conservatism looks like the only game in town. And it is in any case a far happier bedfellow for neoliberal economics than the socialist principles of egalitarianism and working class solidarity. It looks as if Britain will continue with the ‘blues’, whoever wins the next election.

Active Citizenship: Navigating the Conservative Heartlands of the New Labour Project  (Policy & Politics, Volume 40, Number 1) by Jonathan S. Davies, De Montfort University, is available free until 28 February 2014.

The politics of behaviour change: Nudge, neoliberalism and the state

Will LeggettWill Leggett, School of Government and Society, University of Birmingham, discusses his article, ‘The politics of behaviour change: Nudge, neoliberalism and the state’.

In 2013 there was controversy when it emerged in the UK that unemployed jobseekers had unwittingly been used as guinea pigs for a government experiment. They had been told to complete an online psychometric questionnaire called ‘MyStrengths’, with the threat of benefit withdrawal if they did not comply. Having entered their answers, participants were presented with apparently personalised electronic messages of ‘positive reinforcement’ eg that their answers had demonstrated a ‘love of learning’. But it later transpired that no matter what answers were entered, everybody received exactly the same messages. The real objective had been to indiscriminately instil positive psychology among the participants, rather than to meaningfully engage with them.

What had been exposed was a textbook, covert ‘behaviour change’ intervention. From the everyday choices of individuals (what to eat, to recycle) to the activities of errant corporations, behaviour change is a contemporary political buzzword. Of course, politics has always been about trying to shape attitudes and behaviour in some form, so what makes this agenda particularly prominent now? Three related factors stand out. The first is an increasingly complex, differentiated and individualised society, which presents challenges (eg in public health, climate change) that only widespread behaviour change on the part of both individuals and institutions can address. The second factor is political and ideological context. Thirty years of neoliberalism successfully discredited faith in direct, ‘command and control’ state action. The third factor is academic and intellectual, in the form of the rapid rise of the behavioural sciences, led by behavioural economics and psychology, which themselves operate in the advancing shadow of neuroscience. In the UK, these developments came to a head in the enthusiastic take up by the Coalition Government of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s bestselling book on ‘Nudge’ economics, and the corresponding establishment of a ‘Behavioural Insight Team’ – or ‘Nudge Unit’ – in the heart of Whitehall. The Unit has a wide-ranging brief across government, and its fingerprints were unmistakably on last year’s controversial jobseeker/positive psychology experiment.

My article in Policy & Politics examines the interesting assumptions about human action that are presented by Nudge. Most notably, Nudge moves away from the discredited idea that we are fully rational, consistent calculating machines, and instead tries to capture the role of our emotions, snap decisions and fallibility in making choices in various contexts. In particular, it draws our attention to the way our behaviour can be influenced by changes to our ‘choice environment’ (eg by changing the layout of products on supermarket shelving). Nudge’s argument is that policy should go with the grain of this all too human view of humans, rather than fighting against it in the hope we will make fully rational, optimum choices. For example, our inertia makes us prone to go with default options. Rather than futilely trying to overcome human inertia per se, it can be harnessed by policymakers using the default option eg making ‘opt in’ the default with regard to organ donation.

I also explore the complex and paradoxical politics of the behaviour change agenda. Thaler and Sunstein presented their project as a new ‘libertarian paternalism’. It is paternalistic, because nudgers are attempting to promote the best interests of ‘nudgees’ (eg to lose weight). But it is also libertarian in the sense that there is no compulsion, and the individual always ultimately has the option to choose differently/opt-out if they wish. Unsurprisingly, having set itself up as a new libertarian-paternalism, criticisms of Nudging have poured in from both these of these traditions. Paternalists (typically on the statist left) see in Nudge the ideological retreat of state action and responsibility for public goods. Conversely, libertarians (from both left and right) see Nudge as a sinister state incursion into our very brains and decision-making. This ambiguity is reflected in the party political take up of Nudge. Behavioural economic ideas were first encouraged in the UK by New Labour, and might be seen as a classic instance of the ‘nanny statism’ they were often accused of. And yet the behaviour change agenda has been even more enthusiastically co-opted by David Cameron and his anti-statist inner circle.

Beyond these familiar dichotomies, more thought needs to be given to the ways that behaviour change is recasting the state-citizen relation, and what alternative forms the behaviour change state might take. A ‘Nudging state’ risks depoliticising and diminishing our faith in positive state action. In the Nudging model, the state is just another voice trying to grab consumer attention in an already crowded market: it becomes no different to the private sector marketers and advertisers who have been subtly shaping our preferences for many decades. An alternative, social democratic approach could use the behaviour change agenda to reassert the importance of an active state, but in a way that develops more empowering models of citizen engagement than traditional command-and-control approaches. The important insights of behavioural theories should be heeded, but the traditional case for state regulation, mandates and bans needs to be sustained: it is increasingly clear some behaviour change will require a ‘shove’ rather than a nudge (eg smoking in public places). Simultaneously, the case needs to be made that the state is the only institution that can protect citizens against potentially undesirable or damaging attempts to shape their behaviour. This might take the form of direct regulation (eg curbing advertising aimed at children). More creatively, it could involve raising awareness of ubiquitous attempts to shape decision-making, and equipping citizens with the psychological and deliberative toolkit to define and implement – individually and collectively – their own behaviour change agenda. This would necessarily be linked to broader questions about the good society, rather than just immediate ‘choice environments’. So what emerges is a more complex vision of the modern social democratic state, in an age where behaviour change is an integral objective. Crucially, this recognises that behaviour change is not politically neutral, as some of Nudge’s advocates like to suggest. Instead, it raises fundamental questions about the citizen’s relationship to the state and the market, about which social democrats and neoliberals will have very different things to say.

The politics of behaviour change: Nudge, neoliberalism and the state’ is part of the Policy & Politics January 14 issue (volume 42, number 1) and is available on Ingenta.