Attention in the policy process—among individuals, among institutions and organisations, and within political systems—is a scarce resource. Paying attention to one or even a few issues means other issues go unaddressed.
Making a decision and choosing an alternative requires something called the “serial shift”: moving from addressing multiple issues at once, say within a legislative committee system or set of bureaucratic offices, to focussing on one issue at a time. Prioritising an issue on the agenda also means prioritising the advocates and policy conflicts associated with them.
We know a lot about how issues reach the decision agenda. Policy entrepreneurs and coalitions redefine existing issues and try to couple problems with alternatives; media coverage can attract elite attention and contribute to a sense that something should be done; policymakers schedule some issues to periodically recur so that they’re sure to receive attention some time, even if not right now.
We know less about how the serial shift feeds back in to the agenda setting process. Does the serial shift legitimise and certify conflict, signalling which conflicts are considered more legitimate? Or does restricting the decision agenda to one set of conflicts create a flow of attention to other issues?
Have states abdicated their responsibility for tackling misogynist incels?
Incels, which stands for involuntary celibate/celibacy, are mostly associated with the spate of deadly in-person attacks which have occurred across the US, Canada, and the UK. The attacks, and the misogynistic views espoused by those who commit such atrocities, are widely condemned; but we wanted to find out specifically what states are actually doing to address incel violence? In our recent article published in Policy & Politics entitled Comparing policy responses to incels in Sweden and the UK, we looked at how politicians and states are responding to the rise of incel violence. Incel is an identity that is self-ascribed. While ‘incel’ has its origins in a non-misogynistic community1, today it is mostly associated with a group of men who form misogynistic networks across multiple websites and online forums. These incels2 believe that women oppress men through a “rigged” dating market that disadvantages incels. To address their perceived injustice, incels dehumanise women, argue for controlling women’s sexuality, and engage in misogynistic and racist violence both on and off the internet.
Levels of incel activity are high in both the UK and Sweden3 so we were keen to find out what the governments were doing in response. We find that the UK and Swedish governments’ responses to incels are unclear, resulting in a policy lacuna. The state in the UK and Sweden has, in effect, abdicated its responsibility for countering incels’ violence. This is especially concerning because recent reports suggest growing incel activity on social media platforms. Parliaments in both nations are, however, starting to show some interest in the issue; there have been parliamentary debates on incels in both cases. However, of the two, Sweden seems to have a clearer, although limited, response to incels in their countering violent extremism (CVE) strategies. Recent reports suggest that the UK is also heading in the same direction4. However, is taking a CVE approach to incels the right way to go?
Many (local) governments worldwide experiment with citizen participation in policy decision-making. Engaging citizens is assumed to be an answer to the real or perceived crisis of representative democracy. There is, however, no consensus about the extent to which the key actors in democracy – elected politicians, civil servants and lay citizens – perceive participatory policy decision-making as legitimate. We know that elected politicians may be more hesitant than citizens, because the shift from representative to participatory democracy involves a shift in decision-making power. But we also know that within the different groups of democratic actors, there is no consensus as to the value and virtue of increased citizen participation: some politicians are more in favour than others. A similar dissensus can be observed among civil servants and among citizens.
In our recently published article in Policy & Politics, we investigate the existence of ‘multi-actor clusters’: groups of people defined by a shared stance towards citizen participation, irrespective of their formal institutional role in local democracy. Based on data from a vignette survey with 4000+ respondents in Flemish local government (politicians, civil servants and citizens), we find five distinct clusters. Two of these clusters – together comprising more than half of the respondents – prefer participatory over representative policy decision-making. We also find respondents of every type in these two clusters: citizens and council members, but also civil servants and (to a lesser extent) executive politicians. Of the remaining three clusters, one cluster is clearly in favour of representative decision-making. While the other two clusters comprise respondents that either favour and accept or reject all forms of political decision-making (representative and participatory alike).
by Annemieke van den Dool & Tianlei Qiu, Duke Kunshan University
Why do policymakers address some societal issues but not others?
For decades, public policy researchers have tried to answer this question by using the so-called multiple streams framework (MSF). This framework was originally developed to understand policymaking in the USA.
In our recent Policy & Politics article, we provide an overview of 178 studies that use the MSF to analyse policymaking and implementation in China.
We found that scholars increasingly use this framework to examine how policies are made and implemented in China, which is illustrated by the Figure below.
Figure 1: China-focused MSF articles (N = 178) published per year.
The first article that used the MSF to analyse policymaking in China was written by Chao Zhou & Xueyong Yan and published in 2005. They used the framework to identify the driving forces behind China’s State Council’s abolishment of the Custody and Repatriation Measures in 2003, following the domestically well-known case of Sun Zhigang, a migrant worker who was beaten to death after being arrested for failure to show his ID. In their 2005 article, Zhou and Yan show that the Custody and Repatriation Measures had been criticised by academics and some government officials for several years. Yet, it was not until the death of Sun Zhigang that the measures were finally abolished. Important factors that contributed to the abolishment was sustained news attention about Sun Zhigang’s death, which was amplified through online platforms. In addition, law students and legal scholars filed multiple petitions to request an assessment of the extent to which the Custody and Repatriation Measures were consistent with the Constitution.
The United Nations Development Programme has described 2024 as a global elections “Super year”. However, while that may be the case, younger generations across many established democracies remain deeply disillusioned with mainstream electoral politics. This is hardly a revelation, but reflects the findings from a large body of existing research identifying low levels of youth voter turnout. By way of contrast, very little attention has been paid to how young people can – and occasionally do – engage with politicians and officials between elections on issues of importance to them. Even when parties attract overwhelming youth support, such as the Labour Party in 4 July UK General Election, they often have little idea of how to govern for - let alone with - young people. In our recent article for Policy & Politics, we argue that youth engagement with local policy-communities on issues that have meaning for their everyday lives offers a potential antidote to this democratic malaise.
So first the good news. Our research points to an increasing willingness of policymakers to engage with young people – particularly in the area of environmental policy. Less positively, policymakers struggle to provide opportunities for meaningful and sustained engagement. Our article explores where the problems lie and suggests how these might be resolved.
by Oemar van der Woerd, Jitse Schuurmans, Iris Wallenburg, Wilma van der Scheer and Roland Bal
In an attempt to deal with societal issues like changing demographics and the sustainability of welfare state regimes, policymakers increasingly seek solutions to organise care closer to citizens’ homes, in close cooperation between health and social care providers and informal caregivers. ‘The region’ is presented as a promising place to organise and provide a networked model of care (see for instance the Integrated Care Boards in the UK, or caring regions in Scandinavian countries). Yet, the region, as a new entity of governance, must be incorporated into existing governance arrangements. Our central research question in our recent article published in Policy & Politics addressed this issue: How is the region made into a ‘governance object’?
In exploring how the region is made a governance object, we draw on years of (ongoing) research on older person care and care for disabled people in the Netherlands, where we follow regional experiments, such as task reallocation between professionals (see here for more information). We analyse the work of professionals, managers and policymakers in their attempts to shape ‘the region’.
While people in countries such as the United States were discontented and heavily opposed to stricter COVID-19 mitigation measures, why did individuals in some democratic societies voluntarily request and support stringent policies? This was our central research question in our recent article published in Policy & Politics.
Securitisation scholars argue that the exceptionalism of allowing the government to restrict people’s liberties and allocate more resources to certain policies results from successful securitisation—a persuasive process that convinces people that COVID-19 is a national security threat.
However, despite extensive studies applying securitisation theory to public health crises, existing research often lacks empirical data. Additionally, securitisation theory does not clearly define “exceptionalism,” nor does it explain why successful securitisation leads to public support for some policies but not across all related policy areas.
by Thomas Bolognesi, Eva Lieberherr and Manuel Fischer
In our recent article published in Policy & Politics, we investigate the formation of policy preferences, which are critical in the policy process as they primarily drive policymakers’ choices and, consequently, policy design. Therefore, understanding policy preferences is essential for understanding policy design. To define policy preferences, we draw on bounded rationality and complexity theory. To explain policy preference formation, we explore two key mechanisms: the willingness to solve a given problem and affiliation with a particular group. Our central question is to determine the extent to which each mechanism influences policy preferences.
Our analysis reveals that each actor’s policy preference is a specific point within a broader policy preference space, which is defined along multiple policy dimensions (see Figure 1). We use the case of the water sector in Switzerland to measure these three interconnected concepts. By performing a principal component analysis on 39 variables representing choices of policy instruments or organisational structures, we identify four distinct policy preference dimensions: regional planning, privatisation, public financing, and flexible inter-municipal collaboration.
To explain the specific preferences of water policy stakeholders within these four policy preference dimensions, we estimate the role of their water policy goal priorities and affiliations. Goal priorities might include cost saving, security of supply, and resource protection. Affiliations considered in the policy process include different administrative levels of the state or the type of participating actors, such as water suppliers or interest groups. We account for regional specificities to limit the impact of the local context of water governance on our estimates.
Our results provide detailed insights into how the willingness to solve a problem and group affiliation affect preference formation. They reveal two distinct patterns. First, preferences along the policy dimensions are significantly associated with a single goal priority, indicating that actors tend to share a common perspective on how to address specific problems. For instance, the preference for privatisation is negatively associated with infrastructure as a goal priority, while public financing is positively associated with security of supply as a primary policy goal. Conversely, various actor types are significantly associated with policy preference dimensions, confirming that there is collective positioning along these dimensions. Additionally, we find that the more central the policy dimension, the stronger the effect of affiliation on individual positioning. Combining these two effects explains the emergence of policy preference spaces and the diversity among individuals’ preferences.
Our research has significant policy implications. It highlights that a few key policy dimensions, such as the public-private debate in the water sector, shape the policy preference spaces. We also emphasise that the willingness to solve a problem and affiliation with a group influence preference formation through different mechanisms, with variations arising from different levels of analysis (preference dimension, space, individual). This insight is crucial for framing policy change and fostering effective collaboration. Methodologically, we offer a replicable approach to analysing policy preferences that facilitates comparability across cases and enhances the relevance of measurements by being both deductive and inductive.
You can read the original research in Policy & Politics at Bolognesi, T., Lieberherr, E., & Fischer, M. (2024). Identifying and explaining policy preferences in Swiss water management. Policy & Politics, 52(3), 384-411 from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2023D000000004
If you enjoyed this blog post, you may also be interested to read: Hornung, J., & Bandelow, N. C. (2024). Social identities, emotions and policy preferences. Policy & Politics (published online ahead of print 2024) from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2024D000000036
The idea of innovation has become one of the most persistent and sought-after today. While too conceptually elusive to pin down to a single statement, innovation can be broadly understood as a process whereby new elements and approaches are introduced to existing ones, in an attempt to solve problems, add value, and contribute to knowledge. Being a problem-solving, value-oriented process, it is no surprise that the concept of innovation is increasingly finding footholds in different theoretical spaces within policy and political sciences, from collaborative arrangements, democratic practices, policy design and experimentation, to behavioural and cognitive theories. Within the public sector, innovation can be understood as the creation of new policies, services, advisory, governance and political arrangements, often leading to the development of novel shared views of what is acceptable and expected by the public as beneficiaries.
Intuitively, policy learning has a family resemblance to policy innovation. It seems almost self-evident that they should be considered together in the explanation of policy dynamics. Yet the two literatures have developed independently of each other. Studies which put them in conversation are few.
Collaboration in cross-sectoral networks is proliferating in response to different public policy issues such as climate change, public health crises, economic inequality and urban renewal. These collaborative networks are typically characterised as horizontal partnerships, where public, private, and civil society actors have equal power, and work together to achieve shared goals. Yet, some form of governance is necessary for collaborative networks to succeed as they otherwise risk becoming inefficient. But how can power be exercised in the governance of collaborative networks without undermining the capacity of these networks to solve collective problems? This is the question we asked in our article recently published in Policy & Politics, entitled “Metagoverning collaborative networks: A cumulative power perspective”.
Metagovernance is a suitable way of governing collaborative networks, as it relies on a complementary mix of subtle governance mechanisms to indirectly steer collaborative networks towards achieving their goals. In our article, we developed a new framework to understand how power is exercised in collaborative networks through metagovernance. Our framework outlines three types of metagovernance (outputs, inputs, and process) that can be used at different stages of the collaborative process:
Metagoverning outputs: issuing formal project output requirements (legal, financial, administrative) or expressing informal expectations about the project outputs
Metagoverning inputs: selectively enlisting and excluding actors as participants or normatively framing the values, interests, and identities of project participants
Metagoverning processes: steering the conceptual content of the collaborative process toward predefined output goals, for instance by controlling access to resources such as time and knowledge.
Metagovernors can gradually steer collaborative networks towards specific goals based on these three collaborative stages, where power can be exercised repressively or constructively. To show how these insights unfold in practice, we encourage you to read our full article where we present an illustrative case study of the development of a sustainable and socially inclusive craftsmanship dormitory in Denmark. This project was developed in a collaborative network involving teams of architects, artists, students, and consultants (metagovernors), showcasing both the constructive and repressive aspects of power exercised through metagovernance.
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