By Katarina Staronova and Michal Sedlačko
How do expert bureaucrats preserve expertise, autonomy and policy influence when political leaders seek greater control over the bureaucracy? In our new Policy & Politics article, ‘How expert bureaucrats survive illiberal regimes through renegotiating expertise bargains’, we examine how expert bureaucrats in Slovakia responded to growing political pressure following the election of a populist radical right government in 2023. The article forms part of the Policy & Politics special issue forthcoming in 2027, Expertise in Democratic and Autocratic Policymaking: A research agenda, guest edited by Sonja Blum, Ellen Fobé, Valérie Pattyn and Bishoy L. Zaki.
Existing research has shown how authoritarian populists seek to weaken bureaucratic autonomy, politicise appointments and undermine expertise. Our study shifts the focus to expert bureaucrats themselves. Rather than treating them as simply reacting to political change, we examine how they anticipate threats, develop individual and collective strategies, and renegotiate the conditions under which expertise can survive.
We studied Slovakia’s ministerial analytical units, highly professionalised communities of expert bureaucrats responsible for providing evidence-based policy analysis. Drawing on interviews with civil servants who experienced the change of government after the 2023 elections, we examined both their individual strategies and the collective strategies developed through their professional networks.
Before the new government took office, bureaucrats were already considering their “red lines”. Manipulating data, circumventing the law or dismissing qualified staff for political reasons could trigger voluntary exit. Collectively, however, their priority was to prevent disengagement and instead guard institutional memory and preserve expert capacity. Open confrontation was rejected.
As political pressure increased, this strategy became more defensive. Expert bureaucrats sought to demonstrate their legitimacy to the incoming government, reframing themselves as an “in-house consultancy” and identifying how their expertise could help deliver its priorities. At the same time, they avoided politically sensitive areas, kept a lower profile and increasingly concentrated on limiting the effects of technically flawed or harmful policies.
This reveals an important distinction between strong and weak survival. Strong survival preserves bureaucratic autonomy and influence over policymaking. Weak survival means preserving professional expertise, institutional memory and organisational capacity even while autonomy and policy influence are lost. Under illiberal rule, collective strategies encouraged bureaucrats to accept the latter over resistance in the hope of keeping expert institutions weaker but alive, which proved a more sustainable form of survival. At the same time, value dilemmas between individual and collective strategies shape how bureaucrats navigate competing identities as political loyalist, expert bureaucrat, and engaged citizen.
The effectiveness of these strategies also varied across policy areas. Where ideological conflict with the new government was particularly strong, analytical units were more likely to experience dismantling or termination despite their efforts to demonstrate their expertise and usefulness. Such an expert bargain was simply not possible.
In summary, our research shows the importance of professional networks that enable collective strategies in shaping how expert bureaucrats respond to democratic backsliding. We argue that professional networks constitute a key mechanism through which bureaucrats collectively anticipate, strategise and reinterprete their roles tonot only remain in their organisations but refocus their loyalty on public interest in order to preserve institutional memory for the future, while moderating both voluntary exit and overt resistance. This can help expert bureaucracies survive periods of illiberal rule, although survival may come at the cost of reduced autonomy and influence over policymaking.
You can read the original research in Policy & Politics at
bureaucrats survive illiberal regimes through renegotiating expertise bargains. Policy & Politics (published online ahead of print 2026) from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2026D000000104
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Christensen, J., Hesstvedt, S., Pronin, K., Holst, C., Christiansen, P. M., & Holli, A. M. (2026). Experts in governance: a comparative analysis of the Nordic countries. Policy & Politics, 54(1), 163-187 from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2025D000000079
Matthews, F., & Wood, M. (2026). The performance of accountability and the treatment of experts by politicians: UK parliamentary select committees during the COVID-19 pandemic. Policy & Politics, 54(2), 230-252 from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2025D000000080
Ramesh, M., & Howlett, M. (2026). Inferential reasoning in policy analysis: knowledge use under uncertainty and complexity. Policy & Politics (published online ahead of print 2026) from https://doi.org/10.1332/03055736Y2026D000000088
